Identity: Philosophy or Science? by Havrilla, Nicholas
Res Cogitans
Volume 3 | Issue 1 Article 13
6-7-2012
Identity: Philosophy or Science?
Nicholas Havrilla
Portland State University
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CommonKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Res Cogitans by an authorized
administrator of CommonKnowledge. For more information, please contact CommonKnowledge@pacificu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Havrilla, Nicholas (2012) "Identity: Philosophy or Science?," Res Cogitans: Vol. 3: Iss. 1, Article 13.
Res Cogitans (2012) 3:94-100                                                                            2155-4838  | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
 
 
Identity: Philosophy or Science? 
 
 
Nicholas Havrilla 
Portland State University 
 
Published online: 07 June 2012 
© Nicholas Havrilla 2012 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Recently there has been renewed interest in psycho-neural identity theory. This is in large part due to Heuristic Identity 
Theory, which brings some new insights into the relation between psychology and neuroscience. Perhaps even more 
significant is its concept of hypothetical identity that is positioned by McCauley & Bechtel to eclipse classical theories on 
psycho-neural identities in virtue of its relevance to scientific practice, specifically inter-level contexts. McCauley & Bechtel 
claim that in addition to providing an accurate representation of the practices of science Heuristic Identity Theory also 
answers some philosophical objections directed at classical identity theory. The correlation objection states there is no 
conceivable observation that could confirm/refute an identity but not the associated correlation. In this paper, I compare the 
classical psycho-neural identity theories of J.C.C. Smart and U.T. Place to Heuristic Identity Theory through their relation to 
the correlation objection. I aim to clarify the distinction between the two kinds of identity theory, one being philosophical 
while the other a method of science. Through this I will show that the correlation objection is not directed at Heuristic 
Identity Theory and therefore McCauley & Bechtel do not appropriately answer the objection. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Recently there has been renewed interest in psycho-neural identity theory. This is in large part due to 
Heuristic Identity Theory, which brings some new insights into the relation between psychology and 
neuroscience. Perhaps even more significant is its concept of hypothetical identity that is positioned by 
McCauley & Bechtel to eclipse classical theories on psycho-neural identities in virtue of its relevance to 
scientific practice, specifically inter-level contexts. McCauley & Bechtel claim that in addition to 
providing an accurate representation of the practices of science Heuristic Identity Theory also answers 
some philosophical objections directed at classical identity theory. The correlation objection states there 
is no conceivable observation that could confirm/refute an identity but not the associated correlation. In 
this paper, I compare the classical psycho-neural identity theories of J.C.C. Smart and U.T. Place to 
Heuristic Identity Theory through their relation to the correlation objection. I aim to clarify the 
distinction between the two kinds of identity theory, one being philosophical while the other a method of 
science. Through this I will show that the correlation objection is not directed at Heuristic Identity 
Theory and therefore McCauley & Bechtel do not appropriately answer the objection. 
 
2. Place & Smart 
 
The classical psycho-neural identity thesis has its most famous proposals in U.T. Place and J. C. C. 
Smart. Generally, it states that insofar as a statement is reporting a sensation, it is reporting a brain 
process. There is nothing to report about mental phenomena beyond brain processes. As such, sensations 
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are identical to brain processes. Where Place and Smart differ is on the identity theory’s status as a 
hypothesis. 
 
Place defends the physicalist position as not ruled out a priori by dualistic arguments (Place, 44). That 
mental phenomena are processes in the brain is a “reasonable” scientific hypothesis, which is not 
philosophically contradictory (Place, 45). As such, it is a “contingent” empirical claim that makes use of 
the “is of composition” that may or may not receive evidentiary support in the future (Lyons, 101). 
 
We are justified in identifying mental phenomena with a given brain process if we can explain 
psychological observations by reference to the brain process with which it is correlated. What changes 
these two sets of observations from strong correlation to identity is in treating the two sets of 
observations as observations of the same event (Place, 48). To establish mind-brain identity it is 
necessary to show the reports of introspection to be accounted for in terms of brain processes, virtually 
mirroring each other. This vague proposal of the identity thesis received an important criticism from 
Smart. 
 
Smart also commits to the mind-brain identity thesis but adjusts its status from a “straight out” scientific 
hypothesis, in Place’s sense, to an ontological orientation (Smart, 155). Instead of an empirical 
hypothesis, it is rather the result of an application of unificationist values, specifically simplicity, to the 
ontological status of psychological phenomena (Lyons, 104). The thesis is with respect to materialism 
and dualism or immaterialism. There is no conceivable test that could confirm one and falsify the other. 
They are each different ontological theories that provide different explanations for the same facts. The 
issue is in committing oneself to believe in the “nomological danglers,” which Smart “is just unable to 
believe in …, or in the laws whereby they would dangle” (Smart, 143). Admitting this as confession of 
faith, Smart is dissatisfied that everything but mental phenomena should be explicable by physical 
science. As long as there is no philosophical reason to be a dualist, though, we might as well uphold 
virtuous scientific values and be as parsimonious as possible - and dualism “offends” parsimony (Smart, 
155). Echoing Edwin Boring, Smart concedes that its persuasiveness is in its usefulness for science 
(Lyons, 98). 
 
3. Heuristic Identity Theory 
 
McCauley and Bechtel propose an identity thesis that differs radically from Place and Smart’s 
formulations. They identify the identity thesis as more so a method for discovery than the means for 
ontological simplicity or a reductive scientific theory. Instead of identity being strictly the end of 
research, it can also be the beginning through “hypothetical identity” (Bechtel (2002), 236). It is a 
powerful tool used between disciplines of differing levels as a heuristic, such as lower level 
neuroscience and higher-level psychology (also see Shouten & de Jong (2001) for an application to 
genetics). Its purpose and benefit is to generate research that reliably leads to the development of more 
refined and accurate hypotheses (McCauley & Bechtel (2001), 737). Specifically, they aid the 
development of hypotheses that aim to connect two distinct explanatory levels. What motivates the 
formulation of such hypotheses is their potential to further research in each level (753).  
 
McCauley and Bechtel’s proposal stems from observations of the practices of psychology and 
neuroscience. Underlying cognitive neuroscience is a commitment to psycho-neural identity claims 
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(Bechtel (2002), 236). They are of the kind that identifies some functional entity in the field of 
psychology with an entity identified structurally in neuroscience. The details neuroscientists are learning 
about of brain mechanisms and their roles provide good reasons for psychologists to pursue new lines of 
experimentation, and vice versa. It aids the search for supporting or refuting evidence for their own 
research but also those across levels. This can result in the reconsideration of taxonomies and functions 
concerning cognition at both levels (McCauley & Bechtel (2001), 753). Thus, hypothetical identities are 
a valuable process in inter-level contexts. 
 
Their proposal of identity theory, then, is radically different then it’s original formulation in the 1950s. 
They call it Heuristic Identity Theory (HIT). As hypothetical, these type-identities, when of “comparable 
grain,” are heuristics of discovery that inspire multi-level programs of research (McCauley & Bechtel 
(2001), 753). They enable one level of science to exploit the “conceptual, theoretical, methodological 
and evidential resources available at another” – all in the interest of advancing research (753). In 
addition to (potentially) being the conclusions of research (as in Place’s formulation) they are also the 
premises of research (753).  
 
Shouten and de Jong in (2001) called for further clarification on HIT, as so far articulated it is far too 
permissible (Shouten & de Jong, 802). Specifically, more emphasis needs to be put on explanatory 
failure and success in order to “limit the HIT rate” (803). That is to say, not all hypothetical identities 
are justified in their proposal or as interesting as others. In order to limit the proliferation of “false 
positives” or similar downfalls, McCauley and Bechtel need to describe the relevant methods of 
falsification and identity choice – rather than emphasizing how fertile hypothetical identities can be for 
predictions. 
 
Other then the role of a heuristic, then, is there any more description of hypothetical identities available? 
According to McCauley and Bechtel they are strong and falsifiable claims (Bechtel (2002), 236). The 
justification of hypothetical identities is the same as for any other scientific hypothesis and the same 
applies for its rejection (McCauley & Bechtel (2001), 751). They are particularly motivated by the 
predictive and explanatory progress they initiate – which is a way to vindicate the use of some rather 
than others (754). However, obtaining corroborating evidence for identifying some neural process with 
some psychological function along such lines will no more finalize that identity than it would any other 
hypothesis in science (McCauley (2012), 8). However, the more hypotheses the identity informs and the 
more successful those hypotheses prove, the more likely the hypothetical identity will come to serve as a 
reduction science can rely on rather than a baseless hypothetical identity (8).  
 
Hypothetical identities do not require scientific explanations because, rather, they play a significant role 
in providing them (McCauley & Bechtel (2001), 756). Even when erroneous, hypothetical identities can 
provide significant foundation for discovering more adequate theories or models (Bechtel (2002), 235). 
Hence, conjecturing an identity that is not precise or accurate could still be beneficial, as it provides 
routes to eliminate and refine each level’s theories. 
 
A central motivation for comparing HIT to classical identity theory is noticing that no longer is 
“philosophical cleverness” or “metaphysical comfort” the basis from which the identity theory gets it 
support and plausibility (McCauley (2012), 5). In fact, for McCauley and Bechtel it is absurd that 
psycho-neural identities be free from empirical evidence and that metaphysical considerations and the 
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logical circumstances of the identity claims carry so much weight. Rather, it should be empirical and 
explanatory adequacy that supports hypothetical identities (5). The philosophical picture drawn by 
classical identity-theorists and their critics is a misleading characterization of the place of identities in 
science. 
 
HIT shifts the debate about the plausibility of psycho-neural identity theory. It proposes to move the 
assessment of identity theory away from the domain of philosophical and conceptual reflection and 
toward the actual practices of psychology and neuroscience. If philosophical contributions are to carry 
any weight, HIT maintains that with respect to the psychological and neural sciences, philosophical 
accounts should compete (and acknowledge their failure to do so) against our best scientific accounts 
(McCauley (2012), 9). Furthermore, compared to competing accounts of the relation between 
psychology and neuroscience (such as multiple realizability arguments and “psychometrics”) identities 
are most plausible if understood correctly as described by HIT (see Bechtel (2002), 236; and Burnston, 
Sheredos, and Bechtel (2011)). 
 
4. The Correlation Objection 
 
A variety of objections have been launched against the original identity thesis formulation. The 
correlation objection, however, still receives attention and newer formulations (e.g. David Chalmers 
(McCauley & Bechtel (2001), 755)). A classical formulation of it comes from Kim (1966) (McCauley & 
Bechtel (2001), 754). For psycho-neural identities, “there is no conceivable observation that would 
confirm or refute the identity but not the associated correlation” (Kim, 227). Moreover, identity 
statements are not confirmable or refutable as an identity statement. Kim extends this objection to 
psycho-physical theories in general, concluding that they are not empirical hypotheses. Their “facts” are 
not falsifiable and their meaning is exhausted by their respective correlation statements.  
 
Kim’s response even extends to Smart’s particular reasons for adopting identity theory, namely 
ontological simplicity. By moving from correlation statements to identity statements, Smart believes that 
we are ridding ourselves of unnecessary nomological danglers and thus moving towards a simpler and 
more unified science. However, according to Kim this is only a trivial achievement of simplicity, as the 
“factual cash value” of an identity statement is still the correlation. To replace correlation statements 
with identity statements does not achieve simplicity meaningfully as it does not reduce the number of 
“independent primitive assumptions” and the psychological entities in question are still disconnected 
from neural entities (Kim, 230). According to Kim, reducing the amount of primitive physical concepts 
is near tantamount to the parsimony Smart aims for. However, the “ontological simplicity” the Smart’s 
identity theory supplies does not achieve this. 
 
McCauley and Bechtel believe that if “philosophy of science is (often) philosophy of mind enough” HIT 
refutes the correlation objection (McCauley & Bechtel (2001), 754). In fact, in almost every place they 
articulate HIT they mention its success in refuting the classical objection (McCauley & Bechtel (2001), 
754; Bechtel (2002), 236; McCauley (2012), 5). McCauley and Bechtel urge that there is more on the 
table than the logic of confirmation for identity statements. If there was not, then the correlation 
objection would indeed succeed. It is what HIT provides to theories beyond their ontologies that gives 
an adequate response to the correlation objection. 
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McCauley and Bechtel accuse the correlation objection of totally missing the point with respect to 
hypothetical identities’ role in scientific inquiry. Beyond indicating correlations, they stimulate research 
at multiple levels of study by allowing the utilization of explanations from different explanatory levels. 
Hypothetical identities as a methodological heuristic, then, are not justified as much as they are 
vindicated. They do not claim to rule out correlations by way of empirical evidence – but are rather used 
to occasion evidence and explanations (McCauley & Bechtel, 754). The correlation objection, then, 
misses the point entirely by getting the role of identities in scientific practice wrong.  
 
5. Is HIT “philosophy of mind enough?” 
 
It is clear from McCauley and Bechtel’s work that HIT claims to have successfully refuted the 
correlation objection. In sum, the correlation objection does not refute identity theory because it does not 
reflect descriptive scientific practice. It seems there are two kinds of arguments here: philosophy of 
mind conceivability arguments and debates over the specific methods of scientists working in 
psychology and neuroscience. I submit the former is the debate between classic identity theorists like 
Smart and Place while the latter is with respect to abstracting from practice methods of science.  
 
Kim’s formulation of the correlation objection is targeted at Place and Smart’s version of identity 
theory. And Place and Smart’s version of identity theory is not talking about the descriptive use of 
identity in the sciences, at least not beyond their analogies to other kinds of identity. In fact, their 
opponent is dualism. Place argues that a priori psycho-neural identities are not ruled out and thus are 
possible (however low or high their probability of being true are). Smart argues on the basis of 
ontological simplicity – submitting that in accordance with our general values on simplicity and 
unification, we ought to believe in psycho-neural identities as opposed to the existence of some distinct 
ontology where psychological phenomena reside. 
 
The correlation objection has a special force with such proposals because the proposed psycho-neural 
identities offer little in the way meaning and of simplicity. But does the correlation objection at all aim 
to challenge the specific methods of science described by McCauley and Bechtel? 
 
I suggest that the correlation objection is not aimed at hypothetical identities because HIT is not 
“philosophy of mind enough.” It “misses the point” because McCauley and Bechtel have introduced a 
new concept of identity that the correlation objection was not intended to attack. HIT deals with specific 
methods in science that are described and abstracted from case studies rather than justified by some 
philosophical system of mind or science. In fact, that is one of the reasons HIT is interesting because it 
shows a distinct use of identity outside of the reduction of psychological phenomena to neuroscience. 
However, their use in the sciences is irrelevant to the correlation objection’s force to identity theory. The 
correlation objection does not account for the vindication of prediction-inducing hypothetical identities 
because that is not its target. Its target is philosophy of mind arguments and classical reductionism is 
general, where McCauley and Bechtel agree that the correlation objection succeeds (McCauley & 
Bechtel (2001), 754). In fact, they concede that any direct evidence for the identity would succumb to 
the correlation objection (McCauley (2012), 8).  
 
Furthermore, if the correlation objection was a criticism to the methods of science as described or 
abstracted from case studies, why wouldn’t any instance of a scientist satisfied with a reduction or 
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identity answer the correlation objection? Why wouldn’t any description of scientific methods with 
respect to identity or causation “successfully” answer the correlation objection? I submit that in order for 
the correlation objection to apply to HIT, there would need to be analogue correlation objection for the 
practices of science as opposed to the philosophical objection that applies to classical identity theory. 
Shouten and de Jong even point to a new kind of correlation objection resulting from an “inflated HIT 
rate” (Shouten & de Jong, 803). 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Heuristic Identity Theory may indeed provide a better understanding of the practices and relation of 
psychology and neuroscience. However, it is not a philosophy of mind theory in the same way classical 
identity theory is. The cut here of course is that classical identity theory aims to make unempirical-
philosophical claims about ontology where HIT is a method abstracted from case studies in science. The 
correlation objection to the classical identity theory is a philosophical objection. HIT has not responded 
to it, as McCauley & Bechtel claim, because the correlation objection is not attacking HIT. That is to 
say, the correlation objection “misses the point” of hypothetical identities precisely because it was not 
aimed at hypothetical identities. In order for HIT to refute it a bridge needs to be established to import 
the correlation objection’s relevance to hypothetical identities’ vindication (as opposed to justification).  
 
 
References 
 
Bechtel, William. “Decomposing the Mind-Brain: a Long-Term Pursuit.” Brain and Mind. 3.2 (2002): 
229-242. 
 
Burnston, Daniel, Benjamin Sheredos, & William Bechtel. “Hit on the Psychometric Approach.” 
Psychological Inquiry. 22.2 (2011): 108-114. 
 
Kim, Jaegwon. “On the Psycho-Physical Identity Theory.” American Philosophical Quarterly. 3.3 
(1966): 227-235. 
 
Lyons, William E. Matters of the Mind. New York: Routledge, 2001. 
 
McCauley, Robert, & William Bechtel. “Explanatory Pluralism and Heuristic Identity Theory.” Theory 
& Psychology. 11.6 (2001): 736-760. 
 
McCauley, Robert. (forthcoming). “About Face: Philosophical Naturalism, The Heuristic Identity 
Theory, and Recent Findings about Prosopagnosia.” New Perspectives on Type Identity. S. Gozzano & 
C. Hill (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
http://userwww.service.emory.edu/~philrnm/publications/article_pdfs/about_face110610.pdf 
 
Place, U. T. “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?” British Journal of Psychology (London, England : 
1953). 47.1 (1956): 44-50. 
 
Res Cogitans (2012) 3:1                                                                                                                                       Havrilla | 100 
 
 
2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
Schouten, Maurice K. D, & Jong H. L. de. “Pluralism and Heuristic Identification: Some Explorations in 
Behavioral Genetics.” Theory & Psychology. 11.6 (2001): 796-807. 
 
Smart, J. J. C. “Sensations and Brain Processes.” The Philosophical Review. 68.2 (1959): 141-156. 
